Richard J. Aldrich

'Even had I wanted to…' :
Intelligence and Special Operations in the Falklands Campaign
Lawrence Freedman has produced a balanced, well-researched and meticulous account of the Falklands Campaign. It combines scholarship with a lightness of touch. Official history can be -and often is -associated with ponderousness. There is no danger of that here, for the two volumes are tightly written and constitute an enjoyable read. Freedman's long-term interest in this campaign means that he has interviewed most of the key participants, even those who died before he undertook this official commission. 1 However, official history is also associated with notions of 'screening' and security vetting prior to publication. Where secret service is concerned, official history has sometimes constituted an instrument with which the authorities have sought to 'police the past'. 2 Accordingly this essay sets out to explore just what these volumes can tell us about the treacherous landscape of intelligence and special operations.
Intelligence and the Falklands Campaign
What was Lawrence Freedman allowed to see, and what was he permitted to tell?
Conversely, what was excised by the trembling hand of the Cabinet Office? Addressing this question in his preface, he glosses over the exact nature of the material made available to him, referring only to 'a range of delicate and sensitive sources'. Certainly he saw a great deal of Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) material, probably a range of GCHQ material and SIS reports, and in some cases specific intercepts, particularly insofar as they informed strategy and operations. However, one also senses a general aversion to the subject. 'Even had I wanted to', he observes, 'it would have been impossible to provide a comprehensive declassified evaluation of the performance of the intelligence community, or even credit many of the contributions' (vol.II, xxiii. Thirdly, this study sheds new light on the issues of the Falklands aftermath. An entire chapter is devoted to the Franks Enquiry, which looked at a range of issues including intelligence, and the lack of warning of the original invasion. 3 It seems Franks had to fight valiantly to get substantive discussion of the JIC into his report, something which Whitehall repeatedly asked to have excised. This was a typically ludicrous manifestation of the hyper-secret Thatcher era, since the JIC had been frequently discussed in the press by 1983. More shocking is the revelation that Franks seems to have been 'nobbled' in assessing the performance of the intelligence community during the outbreak of the Falklands conflict. Lord Frank's committee accepted the findings of a pre-existing review of this subject, conducted by a senior member of the intelligence community. Even the Cabinet Office at the time thought the submission of this pre-packaged material was odd, noting that it was 'ex post facto' and even had perhaps a 'whiff of exculpation about it'. In short, Freedman largely agrees with the analysis offered by Franks, but has some doubts about the process (vol.II, pp.720-1).
The Falklands and the British Intelligence Community
The most striking intelligence aspect of this study is what is missing. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Roberto Calvi, a banker who aided a global effort to procure Exocets for the Argentineans and ended up under Waterloo Bridge, is conspicuously absent from the index. 4 More disappointing however is Freedman's unnecessary difficulty with words like 'sigint' and 'intercepts'. It is noticeable that the only significant discussion of 'intercepts' occurs in the account of the Belgrano, where they help to clear the government of wrongdoing. It is not permitted anywhere else. The Cabinet Office, it seems, has lost none of its taste for the political use of intelligence. Moreover, the general coyness about sigint is unnecessary since much is now in the public domain. For example, since 1997 we have known that HMS Endurance was in fact a sigint platform.
In the words of her own captain, Nick Barker, the ship was a 'listening station' while the Spanish-speaking operators were known by the rest of the ship's company as 'the Spies'.
Barker adds, 'they were invaluable during the conflict' -again we will not read of this in Freedman. The result was a planned UK sigint satellite codename 'Zircon', budgeted at £100 million, but given the UK's inglorious record in the realm of space, it would probably have cost more. Eventually the plan was uncovered and then abandoned on cost grounds, with Whitehall opting to lease American satellites on a timeshare basis. Of course, the story of Zircon has been told elsewhere and is often portrayed as an effort to stabilise the AngloAmerican intelligence relationship. However when viewed in the context of the Falklands campaign, one wonders whether this is the full story. 6 In 1982, Britain's European allies rallied to her cause quicker than the Americans. 7 The
Defence Secretary, John Nott is quoted in this study as asserting that: 'In so many ways The humble unofficial historian has little to go on here. Recently, UK file releases from the Ministry of Defence have slowed to a trickle and so it is hard to probe events after 1970. 10 However, the limited evidence now extant suggests that the attitude was more hard-nosed bargaining rather than bonhomie. In August 1975, some British diplomats had been asking why the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) spent so much time collecting information on subjects of no earthly interest to the UK, which sometimes led to collection operations that were 'ill-advised'. PUSD defended the DIS and interjected that this was often gathered to please the Americans and was intended to offset the vast amount of material that they provided to the UK. They observed that intelligence exchange was 'the last bastion' of the special relationship, adding that it 'gives us an entrée to American political thinking in a way that no other country is able to benefit.' In short, the Anglo-American intelligence relationship also provided a window on Washington. One presumes that such America-watching must have been a big factor during the Falklands Campaign. 11 America-watching has since become a growing activity for all American allies.
12
Deception and Special Forces
Intelligence is not a distinct subject, but merges seamlessly with deception, psychological warfare and special operations. One post-war intelligence chief remarked that intelligence is normally a 'Cinderella service' -and it is war that 'changes Cinderella into the Princess'. This is perhaps even more true of deception, which remains relatively inactive until cover is required for military operations. After 1945, the UK had taken unusual care to preserve a strategic deception infrastructure. This was distilled into a small organisation, the Freedman prefers the strategic to the tactical, and so is better on the command problems of integrating irregular elements into a regular campaign. Special forces were given a number of traditional roles to which they were ideally suited, not least the destruction of local air power through a successful raid on the Argentine airfield at Pebble Island.
However, they also fulfilled another traditional role, that of irritating senior officers by ignoring normal command structures. There were other problems. Too few regular officers understood what special forces could and could not do, meanwhile the plethora of special forces resulted in continual pressure to use them, producing some attacks and operations that were of marginal value (vol.II, p.729).
Command and control special forces -and indeed intelligence assets -within military theatres of command has great contemporary significance and has spawned its own theological literature. Like so many of the lessons draw out by Freedman -including the procedures for interrogation of POWs -these matters are never more pertinent than now.
Indeed his most telling observation is his conclusion that while the Falklands campaign 'stands out as an anomaly in recent international history, the last war of a past imperial era … it can now be recognised as one of the first of the coming post cold-war era'
(vol.II, p.747). He is surely right. Accordingly, while the intelligence dimension is limited, nevertheless, Freedman will be required reading and contains much that is of more than mere historical interest.
